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Studies that find differences between the quality of compre-
hension of interlocutors and of overhearers (e.g., Schober & Clark
1989; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark 1992) might be taken as evidence to
support the idea of radically different cognitive processes in in-
teractive discourse. They need not be. In such studies interlocu-
tors had opportunities for feedback and repair that the overhear-
ers lacked. Because different people will misunderstand different
things, those who can ask for clarification will receive feedback
that is relevant to them and consequently might understand bet-
ter. Therefore any difference between such noninteractive and in-
teractive comprehension could be fully attributable to strategic,
effortful feedback but not necessarily to automatic alignment. In
fact, Barr and Keysar (2002) found that even when such feedback
is removed, listeners who believed themselves to be overhearers
automatically aligned their semantic representations with the
speaker’s to the same degree as listeners who believed themselves
to be addressees.
In closing, far from qualitatively changing the nature of pro-
cessing, it is likely that dialogue provides a radically different con-
text in which the same processes operate. The context includes an
interlocutor and mechanisms for feedback and interactive repair.
For us there is no question that it is important to study conversa-
tion in vivo, but it remains to be seen whether this would reveal
automatic processes that are truly unique to dialogue.
NOTE
1. In their seminal work on common ground, Clark and Marshall
(1981) clearly make the case that common ground is a form of meta-
knowledge that is conceptually distinct from shared knowledge. What
P&G are referring to by “implicit common ground” is really just shared
knowledge, not common ground, because interlocutors need not repre-
sent the fact that their representations are shared. Such usage is certain to
contribute to the legacy of confusion that has plagued discussions of mu-
tual knowledge and common ground (see Keysar 1997 and Lee 2001 for
discussion).
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Abstract: I argue that alignment of linguistic representations and situa-
tion models in dialogue are qualitatively distinct. By virtue of the isomor-
phy between interlocutors’ linguistic representations, interlocutors align
their linguistic representations fully. However, evidence about situation
models is indirect and mediated through language, with the result that
alignment of situation models is only partial.
Pickering & Garrod (P&G) provide a plausible and very welcome
account of language processing in dialogue. Their account assigns
a central importance to the notion of alignment. Here I consider
the nature of alignment and, in particular, whether alignment of
strictly linguistic representations and alignment of situation mod-
els are qualitatively distinct.
P&G suggest that successful dialogue arises from the alignment
of representations between interlocutors, and particularly align-
ment of situation models. Alignment is defined as interlocutors
having the same representation at a particular level of structure.
It is uncontroversial that language is represented in the same way
in different speakers. Linguists and psycholinguists assume a com-
mon competence grammar in adult speakers (Chomsky 1965),
even though they may differ as to whether this grammar is innate
(e.g., Pinker 1989) or to some extent constructed through experi-
ence (e.g., Tomasello 2000). Crucially, adult speakers’ internalised
knowledge of the syntax, lexicon, and morpho-phonology of a lan-
guage is held to be identical, such that there is an isomorphic map-
ping from any one speaker’s internalised representation of the lan-
guage to any other’s. In a dialogue, then, interlocutors necessarily
make use of identical representations in producing their utter-
ances.
Under P&G’s maximally parsimonious assumption of parity of
representations, interlocutors also necessarily draw upon identi-
cal representations in both producing and comprehending utter-
ances. Note also that speakers’ utterances provide direct linguis-
tic evidence to the listener. So when a listener hears an utterance,
he receives direct evidence (except in cases of mishearing or un-
resolved structural ambiguities) about the syntactic, lexical, and
morpho-phonological representations that the speaker has em-
ployed. If a speaker produces an utterance like I am in row two,
for example, the listener has direct evidence that she has used the
words I, am, and so on (and their relevant inflectional markings),
that she has used a pronoun and a verb and so on, and that she
has used a noun phrase, a verb phrase, a prepositional phrase, and
so on. Taken together, the combination of isomorphy of repre-
sentations and direct evidence strongly supports P&G’s con-
tention (summarised in their Fig. 2) that linguistic representa-
tions used by interlocutors in dialogue act directly upon one
another, and that, in a very real sense, when we talk about inter-
locutors having aligned linguistic representations, we mean that
those representations are identical. In summary, P&G’s argu-
ments for full alignment at linguistic levels of representation
seem well founded.
But are situation models aligned in the same way as linguistic
representations? It is unclear that this is the case. In P&G’s model,
interlocutors’ situation models act directly upon one another (see
the authors’ Fig. 2), in the same way as syntactic, lexical, and mor-
pho-phonological representations do, and alignment of situation
models is taken as critical for successful communication. But sit-
uation models differ qualitatively from strictly linguistic repre-
sentations. A speaker’s utterances do not give direct evidence of
the situation model that the speaker holds, only indirect evidence
encoded in linguistic representations, from which the listener has
to infer the speaker’s situation model. So whereas an utterance like
I am in row two gives direct evidence about the speaker’s syntac-
tic, lexical, and morpho-phonological representations, it gives only
indirect evidence about the speaker’s situation model. The listener
must construct a situation model based upon his or her interpre-
tation of the speaker’s meaning – which may or may not be cor-
rect. Of course, as P&G note, misunderstandings may come to
light, and interlocutors may initiate repairs to bring about situa-
tion models that are aligned in the relevant aspects. But as they
also note, some misunderstandings may not be repaired. In fact,
it seems likely that interlocutors quite frequently have situation
models that are misaligned in major respects. Communication will
be (apparently) successful as long as the misalignment is not ap-
parent to the interlocutors. To take P&G’s example of interlocu-
tors using John to refer to different people, it is quite possible for
them to have a mutually satisfying dialogue concerning this per-
son without ever realising that they are discussing different peo-
ple; unless one of them says something that is inconsistent with
the other’s knowledge, they can successfully (for their purposes)
complete a dialogue with quite radically different situation mod-
els. Equally, a doctor and a patient may have a dialogue concern-
ing the patient’s chronic back problem that appears to be success-
ful, in that they are both satisfied that they understand each other
well; yet their situation models may differ considerably because of
unresolved (and unapparent) differences in their interpretation of
chronic. Situation models need only be aligned sufficiently for the
current communicative goal to be (apparently) met.
So it seems that alignment of situation models and alignment of
linguistic representations are quite different. With linguistic rep-
resentations, interlocutors genuinely employ aligned (i.e., identi-
cal) representations that act directly upon one another; whereas,
because evidence for situation models is only indirect, interlocu-
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tors rarely if ever have identical models. Instead, they have par-
tially aligned models that may differ in many – sometimes impor-
tant – respects. And because evidence for situation models is me-
diated through language, it seems highly unlikely that they can act
directly upon one another (contra P&G’s Fig. 2).
One interesting result of the distinction between alignment of
linguistic and situation models is that alignment of linguistic rep-
resentations may sometimes lead to misaligned situation models.
Garrod and Clark (1993) found that young children had a ten-
dency to use the same words to describe a maze – that is, showed
lexical alignment – even when their situation models were quite
different. Similarly, in the case of the doctor-and-patient scenario,
one speaker’s use of the term chronic may well reinforce the
other’s use of the same term, leading to more misunderstanding
than if a different term were used. In both examples, full align-
ment at the linguistic level misleads interlocutors into believing
that they also have alignment at the level of situation models.
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Abstract: Pickering & Garrod’s (P&G’s) call to study language processing
in dialogue context is an appealing one. Their interactive alignment model
is ambitious, aiming to explain the converging behavior of dialogue part-
ners via both intra- and interpersonal priming. However, they ignore the
flexible, partner-specific processing demonstrated by some recent dia-
logue studies. We discuss implications of these data.
In human language processing, the whole is greater than the sum
of the parts; therefore, those who study the language processing sys-
tem in dialogue contexts are poised to make different sorts of dis-
coveries than those who study the parts working alone. Pickering &
Garrod (P&G) present a convincing argument that psycholinguists
should pay attention to dialogue. In fields such as artificial intelli-
gence and human-computer interaction, where the goal is often to
build a fully working dialogue partner, many will find this a worthy
enterprise as well. After presenting evidence for phonological, lex-
ical, and syntactic convergence between dialogue partners and for
representations shared between comprehension and production,
P&G make a strong claim that is far less convincing: “normal con-
versation does not routinely require modeling the interlocutor’s
mind” (sect. 4.4, para. 4). They support this position with evidence
from studies that fail to meet the very standards they seek to ad-
vance, while ignoring evidence that complicates matters for their in-
teractive alignment model. Thus, their position on the importance
of studying language in dialogue does not go far enough.
This position assumes that interlocutors achieve aligned men-
tal representations without having to track anything specific about
each other’s knowledge because both have evolved with the same
cognitive architecture; what is easiest for speakers is easiest for ad-
dressees (Brown & Dell 1987). It further assumes that there is no
need to track common ground, as interlocutors each use their own
memory of the conversation as a proxy. By this argument, what ap-
pears to be partner-specific or “audience design” is actually in-
flexible and unavoidable, at least in the earliest moments of pro-
cessing. P&G propose a two-stage model (similar to that of Horton
& Keysar 1996), arguing that interlocutors “do not routinely take
common ground into account during initial processing . . . full
common ground is only used when simpler mechanisms are inef-
fective” (sect. 4.1, last para.). This (circular) view relegates any as-
pect of production or interpretation that displays flexibility or sen-
sitivity to an interlocutor’s needs (as distinct from one’s own) to the
status of a relatively late adjustment, managed as a kind of repair
or pragmatic garden path.
Granted, it is difficult to design a good experiment on audience
design. A good experiment must distinguish one interlocutor’s
perspective from another’s, avoid confounding individual per-
spectives with common ground (Keysar 1997), and allow inter-
locutors to interact naturally or contingently (Schober & Brennan
2003). But we are surprised that studies succeeding in all this (and
finding partner-specific effects early in processing, e.g., Hanna et
al. 2003; Nadig & Sedivy 2002) are dismissed by P&G: “their task
was repetitive and involved a small number of items, and listeners
were given explicit information about the discrepancies in knowl-
edge” (target article, sect. 4.2, para. 3). Then follows a very broad
claim: “Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that listen-
ers develop strategies that may invoke full common ground. Dur-
ing natural dialogue, we predict that such strategies will not nor-
mally be used.”
Paradoxically, evidence to support this position comes mainly
from studies that did not allow any potential for interaction. These
include Brown and Dell (1987), Ferreira and Dell (2000), Horton
and Keysar (1996), and others in which partners did not interact
naturally or provide contingent feedback. Sometimes this matters;
for example, Brown and Dell (1987) concluded that speakers did
not take addressees’ specific needs into account when retelling
stories; but their addressees had no needs (they were confeder-
ates who knew the stories better than the speakers did). When we
ran a similar study using spontaneously interacting speakers and
addressees (Lockridge & Brennan 2002), speakers’ early syntactic
choices indeed showed sensitivity to addressees’ needs.
There is additional good evidence of rapid, partner-specific ef-
fects from the comprehension side. Hanna and Tanenhaus (2004)
asked addressees to follow a (confederate) speaker’s directions in
a cooking task (e.g., Hand me the cake mix); the addressees’ eye
fixations showed that they restricted candidate referents for am-
biguous expressions (e.g., when two cake mixes were present) de-
pending on what the speaker was holding and what she could not
reach; they did this from the earliest moments of processing.
And we have demonstrated that addressees interpret the same
utterance differently when it is spoken by different speakers with
whom the addressees have different dialogue histories (Metzing
& Brennan 2001; 2003). In our experiment, addressees were in-
structed by (confederate) speakers to reposition objects among a
relatively large set; they did this several times, evolving shared
perspectives and terms for critical objects (e.g., the shiny cylin-
der). Then the speaker left the room and either returned or else a
new confederate speaker entered. In the final trial, the new or old
speaker used either the familiar term or a new, equally good term
(e.g., the silver pipe) for the same critical object (amid many other
references that did not use different terms). Addressees gazed im-
mediately at the object when either speaker used the old term.
However, when the old speaker used a new term (inexplicably
breaking a conceptual pact), addressees experienced interference,
delaying gazing at the target object. There was no such delay when
the new speaker used the new term (in fact, resolving this was just
as fast as the old term spoken by the new speaker). This partner-
specific interference suggests that the pragmatic force of break-
ing a conceptual pact has impact immediately, rather than just as
a late adjustment or repair.
Such immediate effects provide evidence of impressive agility
and potential for partner-specific processing in the language pro-
cessing system, which the interactive alignment proposal fails to
address. Pragmatic and partner-specific knowledge is imple-
mented by basic mechanisms of memory and does not rely on spe-
cial processes or exhaustive partner models. Audience design –
truly partner-specific processing – can occur immediately and ef-
fortlessly as well as more slowly and deliberately, depending on
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